"We have seen that the vital longing for human immortality finds no consolation in reason and that reason leaves us without incentive or consolation in life and life itself without real finality. But here, in the depths of the abyss, the despair of the heart and of the will and the scepticism of reason meet face to face and embrace like brothers... Scepticism, uncertainty -- the position to which reason, by practising its analysis upon itself, upon its own validity, at last arives -- is the foundation upon which the heart's dispair must build up its hope." pp. 94
"We must make of [the war between our reason and our feelings], of war itself, the very condition of spiritual life." pp. 94
"[Life's] sole formula is: all or nothing. Feeling does not compound its differences with middle terms." pp. 95
"The methodical doubt of Descartes is ... purely theoretical and provisional... [Descartes] framed for himself a provisional ethic... the first law of which was to observe the customs of his country and to keep always to the religion in which, by the grace of God, he had been instructed from his infancy, governing himself in all things according to the most moderate opinions. Yes, exactly, a provisional religion and even a provisional God! And he chose the most moderate opinions 'because these are always the most convenient for practice.'" pp. 94-5
"[The] rationalist takes away our fever by taking away our life, and promises us, instead of a concrete, an abstract immortality, as if the hunger for immortality that consumes us were an abstract and not a concrete hunger!" pp. 98
"We shall see presently that to believe is, in the first instance, to wish to believe." pp. 100
"The will and the intelligence seek opposite ends: that we may absorb the world into ourselves, appropriate it to ourselves, is the aim of the will; that we may be absorbed into the world, that of the intelligence... The intelligence is monist or pantheist, the will monotheist or egoist." pp. 101
"[To] believe in the immortality of the soul is to wish that the soul may be immortal, but to wish it with such force that this volition shall trample reason under foot and pass beyond it. But reason has its revenge." pp. 102
"Nothing is sure. Everything is elusive and in the air." pp.104
"Because he believes--that is to say, because he wishes to believe, because he has need that his son should be cured--he beseeches the Lord to help his unbelief, his doubt that such a cure could be effectd. Of such kind is human faith" pp. 106
"Sufro yo a tu costa,
Dios no existiente, pues si tu' existieras
existieri'a yo tambien de veras." pp. 107
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
Tragic Sense of Life; Ch. VIII
"[W]e have at times the direct feeling of God, above all in mooments of spiritual suffocation. And this feeling--mark it well, for all that is tragic in it and the whole tragic sense of life is founded upon this--this feeling is a feeling of hunger for God, of the lack of God. To believe in God is, in the first instance, as we shall see, to wish that there may be a God, to be unable to live without Him." pp. 149
"And God does not exist, but rather super-exists, and He is sustaining our existence, existing us (existie'ndonos)." pp. 149
"God is and reveals Himself in collectivity. And God is the richest and most personal of human conceptions." pp. 150
"The concept that is most extensive and at the same time least comprehensive is that of being or of thing, which embraces everything that exists and possesses no other distinguishing quality than that of being... And the logical or rational God, the God obtained by way of negation, the absolute entity, merges, like reality itself, into nothingness; for, as Hegel pointed out, pure being and pure nothingness are identical." pp. 150
"And there may be a truer revelation in superstition itself than in theology. The venerable Father of the long beard and white locks who appears among the clouds carrying the globe in his hand is more living and more real than the ens realissimum of theodicy." pp. 157
"In its etymological signification to exist is to be outside of ourselves, outside of our mind: ex-sistere. But is there anything outside of our mind, outside of our consciousness which embraces the sum of the known? Undoubtedly there is. The matter of knowledge comes to us from without. And what is the mode of this matter? It is impossible for us to know, for to know is to clothe matter with form, and hence we cannot know the formless as formless. To do so would be tantamount to investing chaos with order." pp. 161
"We wish not only to save ourselves, but to save the world from nothingness. And therefore God. Such is His finality as we feel it." pp. 162
"If [the supposition of objectified reason without will and feeling] is reality, our life is deprived of sense and value.
It is not, therefore, rational necessity, but vital anguish that impels us to believe in God. And to believe in God is, before and above all, to feel a hunger for God, a hunger for divinity, to be sensible of His lack and absence, to wish that God may exist." pp. 162
Personification:
"This eternal and eternalizing person who gives meaning--and I will add, a human meaning, for there isnone other--to the Universe, is it a substantial something, existing independently of our consciousness, independently of our desire? Here we arrive at the insoluble, and it is best that it should be so. Let it suffice for reason that it cannot prove the impossibility of His existence." pp. 163
"And God does not exist, but rather super-exists, and He is sustaining our existence, existing us (existie'ndonos)." pp. 149
"God is and reveals Himself in collectivity. And God is the richest and most personal of human conceptions." pp. 150
"The concept that is most extensive and at the same time least comprehensive is that of being or of thing, which embraces everything that exists and possesses no other distinguishing quality than that of being... And the logical or rational God, the God obtained by way of negation, the absolute entity, merges, like reality itself, into nothingness; for, as Hegel pointed out, pure being and pure nothingness are identical." pp. 150
"And there may be a truer revelation in superstition itself than in theology. The venerable Father of the long beard and white locks who appears among the clouds carrying the globe in his hand is more living and more real than the ens realissimum of theodicy." pp. 157
"In its etymological signification to exist is to be outside of ourselves, outside of our mind: ex-sistere. But is there anything outside of our mind, outside of our consciousness which embraces the sum of the known? Undoubtedly there is. The matter of knowledge comes to us from without. And what is the mode of this matter? It is impossible for us to know, for to know is to clothe matter with form, and hence we cannot know the formless as formless. To do so would be tantamount to investing chaos with order." pp. 161
"We wish not only to save ourselves, but to save the world from nothingness. And therefore God. Such is His finality as we feel it." pp. 162
"If [the supposition of objectified reason without will and feeling] is reality, our life is deprived of sense and value.
It is not, therefore, rational necessity, but vital anguish that impels us to believe in God. And to believe in God is, before and above all, to feel a hunger for God, a hunger for divinity, to be sensible of His lack and absence, to wish that God may exist." pp. 162
Personification:
"This eternal and eternalizing person who gives meaning--and I will add, a human meaning, for there isnone other--to the Universe, is it a substantial something, existing independently of our consciousness, independently of our desire? Here we arrive at the insoluble, and it is best that it should be so. Let it suffice for reason that it cannot prove the impossibility of His existence." pp. 163
Tragic Sense of Life; Ch. 1 excerpts
From Spinoza:
"Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being. [Also] the endeavour wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. [...] The endeavour whereby each individual thing endeavours to persist involves no finite time but indefinite time. That is to say that you, I, and Spinoza wish never to die and that this longing of ours never to die is our actual essence."
"To propose to a man that he should be someone else, that he should become someone else, is to propose to him that he should cease to be himself."
"... for me the becoming other than I am, the breaking of the unity and continuity of any life, is to cease to be he who I am--that is to say, it is simply to cease to be. And that--no! Anything rather than that!"
"The values we are discussing are, as you see, values of the heart, and against values of the heart reasons do not avail. For reasons are only reasons--that is to say, they are not even truths. There is a class of pedantic label-mongers, pedants by nature and by grace, who remind me of that man who, purposing to console a father whose son has suddenly died in the flower of his years, says to him, "Patience, my friend, we all must die!" Would you think it strange if this father were offended at such an impertinence? For it is an impertinence. There are times when even an axiom can become an impertinence."
"Little can be hoped from a ruler... who has not at some time or other been preoccupied, even if only confusedly, with the first beginning and the ultimate end of all things, and above all of man, with the "why" of his origin and the "wherefore" of his destiny."
"It is not enough to think about our destiny: it must be felt."
"So far as I am concerned, I will never willingly yield myself, nor entrust my confidence, to any popular leader who is not penetrated with the feeling that he who orders a people orders men, men of flesh and bone, men who are born, suffer, and, although they do not wish to die, die; men who are ends in themselves, not merely means; men who must be themselves and not others; men, in fine, who seek that which we call happiness. It is inhuman, for example, to sacrifice one generation of men to the generation which follows, without having any feeling for the destiny of those who are sacrificed, without having any regard, not for their memory, not for their names, but for them themselves."
"The chiefest sanctity of a temple is that it is a place to which men go to weep in common... Yes, we must learn to weep!"
"...man, by the very fact of being a man, of possessing consciousness, is, in comparison with the ass or the crab, a diseased animal. Consciousness is a disease."
"Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being. [Also] the endeavour wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. [...] The endeavour whereby each individual thing endeavours to persist involves no finite time but indefinite time. That is to say that you, I, and Spinoza wish never to die and that this longing of ours never to die is our actual essence."
"To propose to a man that he should be someone else, that he should become someone else, is to propose to him that he should cease to be himself."
"... for me the becoming other than I am, the breaking of the unity and continuity of any life, is to cease to be he who I am--that is to say, it is simply to cease to be. And that--no! Anything rather than that!"
"The values we are discussing are, as you see, values of the heart, and against values of the heart reasons do not avail. For reasons are only reasons--that is to say, they are not even truths. There is a class of pedantic label-mongers, pedants by nature and by grace, who remind me of that man who, purposing to console a father whose son has suddenly died in the flower of his years, says to him, "Patience, my friend, we all must die!" Would you think it strange if this father were offended at such an impertinence? For it is an impertinence. There are times when even an axiom can become an impertinence."
"Little can be hoped from a ruler... who has not at some time or other been preoccupied, even if only confusedly, with the first beginning and the ultimate end of all things, and above all of man, with the "why" of his origin and the "wherefore" of his destiny."
"It is not enough to think about our destiny: it must be felt."
"So far as I am concerned, I will never willingly yield myself, nor entrust my confidence, to any popular leader who is not penetrated with the feeling that he who orders a people orders men, men of flesh and bone, men who are born, suffer, and, although they do not wish to die, die; men who are ends in themselves, not merely means; men who must be themselves and not others; men, in fine, who seek that which we call happiness. It is inhuman, for example, to sacrifice one generation of men to the generation which follows, without having any feeling for the destiny of those who are sacrificed, without having any regard, not for their memory, not for their names, but for them themselves."
"The chiefest sanctity of a temple is that it is a place to which men go to weep in common... Yes, we must learn to weep!"
"...man, by the very fact of being a man, of possessing consciousness, is, in comparison with the ass or the crab, a diseased animal. Consciousness is a disease."
Heidegger's Being and Time by Dermot Moran
Dermot Moran’s “Heidegger’s Being and Time” attempts to evaluate the place of Being and Time in the phenomenological tradition subsequent Husserl. Moran understands the tradition of phenomenology, to the extent that phenomenology can be called a tradition, as the divergent amalgamation of thinkers operating in their own self-identified practice of phenomenology. The common strand found in each of these thinkers is an emphasis on dealing with phenomena as such, and for Heidegger particularly this is understood as acknowledging the appearance of objects insofar as they appear in Dasein (literally "being there").
The central aim of Moran’s paper is to lay out the phenomenological aspects of Heidegger’s inquiry in Being and Time. To do this, Moran begins by relating the genesis and evolution of Heidegger’s phenomenology, prior to the publication of Being and Time, as germinating in his review of Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of World Views, in his interpretation of Aristotle, and in what Moran calls Heidegger’s “critical appropriation” of Husserl’s phenomenology as a practice along with Husserl’s conception of intentionality. Heidegger criticizes the abstract quality of Jasper’s philosophy of life in favor of a phenomenology historically bounded by a living being, he infuses Aristotle’s concepts with phenomenological content, and he created a distinct method from the basic notion in Husserl’s phenomenology (“to the thing in itself”) while throwing out key notions to Husserl’s phenomenological enterprise (e.g. intentionality and the transcendental ego, among many others). All of this provides the groundwork, says Moran, for Heidegger’s enterprise of asking the question of the meaning of Being.
Moran continues to develop Heidegger by discussing the distinction between ready-at-hand and present-at-hand, the “fusion of phenomenology with hermeneutics” (234), the hermeneutical circle, the nature of Dasein, authenticity, angst, mood, and being-with. A being’s being ready-at-hand or present-at-hand has everything to do with how the thing (construed phenomenologically) discloses itself to Dasein: as a tool or as an object of inquiry. Moreover, an object’s being ready-at-hand is how it is initially disclosed to Dasein. By the fusion of phenomenology with hermeneutics Moran has in mind Heidegger’s understanding phenomena as the primordial datum associated with being-in-the-world that are given meaning through interpretation. This interpretation is always done in a context of prejudices (taken non-pejoratively) or what Searle calls a background of information (though Heidegger's conception is at least as rich as Quine's "web of belief"), and the interpretation itself creates and destroys prejudices (or background information, or nodes in the web of belief). This view of the world leads to what is called the hermeneutical circle, construed by the naïve observer as the “circle” Heidegger is stuck in between prejudices and interpretation. The objection is that Heidegger cannot account for new knowledge. The objection is easily avoided by considering Heidegger’s notion of being “thrust” into the world, that being-in-the-world is primary, and that we are and can only be able to gain knowledge by allowing phenomena to disclose their being. This latter possibility requires diligence on the part of the enquirer for its realizability. Moran goes on from there to give phenomenological descriptions of Being-as-authentic, being-towards-death, mood for being, and being-with-others.
The central aim of Moran’s paper is to lay out the phenomenological aspects of Heidegger’s inquiry in Being and Time. To do this, Moran begins by relating the genesis and evolution of Heidegger’s phenomenology, prior to the publication of Being and Time, as germinating in his review of Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of World Views, in his interpretation of Aristotle, and in what Moran calls Heidegger’s “critical appropriation” of Husserl’s phenomenology as a practice along with Husserl’s conception of intentionality. Heidegger criticizes the abstract quality of Jasper’s philosophy of life in favor of a phenomenology historically bounded by a living being, he infuses Aristotle’s concepts with phenomenological content, and he created a distinct method from the basic notion in Husserl’s phenomenology (“to the thing in itself”) while throwing out key notions to Husserl’s phenomenological enterprise (e.g. intentionality and the transcendental ego, among many others). All of this provides the groundwork, says Moran, for Heidegger’s enterprise of asking the question of the meaning of Being.
Moran continues to develop Heidegger by discussing the distinction between ready-at-hand and present-at-hand, the “fusion of phenomenology with hermeneutics” (234), the hermeneutical circle, the nature of Dasein, authenticity, angst, mood, and being-with. A being’s being ready-at-hand or present-at-hand has everything to do with how the thing (construed phenomenologically) discloses itself to Dasein: as a tool or as an object of inquiry. Moreover, an object’s being ready-at-hand is how it is initially disclosed to Dasein. By the fusion of phenomenology with hermeneutics Moran has in mind Heidegger’s understanding phenomena as the primordial datum associated with being-in-the-world that are given meaning through interpretation. This interpretation is always done in a context of prejudices (taken non-pejoratively) or what Searle calls a background of information (though Heidegger's conception is at least as rich as Quine's "web of belief"), and the interpretation itself creates and destroys prejudices (or background information, or nodes in the web of belief). This view of the world leads to what is called the hermeneutical circle, construed by the naïve observer as the “circle” Heidegger is stuck in between prejudices and interpretation. The objection is that Heidegger cannot account for new knowledge. The objection is easily avoided by considering Heidegger’s notion of being “thrust” into the world, that being-in-the-world is primary, and that we are and can only be able to gain knowledge by allowing phenomena to disclose their being. This latter possibility requires diligence on the part of the enquirer for its realizability. Moran goes on from there to give phenomenological descriptions of Being-as-authentic, being-towards-death, mood for being, and being-with-others.
Monday, September 10, 2007
A Synopsis of William Barrett’s The Flow of Time
In The Flow of Time William Barrett argues that the flowing of time into the future is as primordial a datum as Heidegger’s view of time as a field of “past-present-future” (where time is understood to be a unifying, possibility-producing synthesis relied on heavily in Being and Time). Barrett propounds Heidegger’s construal of time, as a structuring ontological field rather than a mere “sequence of disjunct Now’s”, as “one of the most original of contemporary views on this ancient subject.” (356) As such, Barrett’s point of contention regarding Heidegger is restricted to the foundational, pre-philosophic landscape (to which, presumably, we each were party in, at least, our early childhood) that yields the notion of time in its disparate historical forms. (364) Accordingly, a correct account of time and the one that Heidegger implicitly relies on, according to Barrett, incorporates the flow of time within the horizon of possibility afforded by temporality.
Barrett’s first consideration wrestles with historical dating. First, Barrett notes that Heidegger makes much of the fact that we are “thrown” into the world at some time, t, notwithstanding Heidegger’s refusal to acknowledge t as intelligible outside of some “human project” (where project is meant in two senses: a project among one’s many projects, and the project[ion] of one’s existence). Barrett professes the belief that a certain sense of “datability of events” is intelligible outside of particular human projects and projections, e.g. “the fixing of events in relation to before and after”, and that if this fails to be the case then Heidegger brandishes little more than “a mere subjective idealism”. ( 364-5) The process of fixing events in relation to before and after can be thought of as a wanderer marking his trail on some sort of map in order to properly orient himself to his environment, except that for the analogy to fit the wanderer cannot stop nor reverse his journey: his map’s use is exhausted by the process of orientation.
Barrett then remarks on thoughts germinating in later works by Heidegger. As these considerations lie beyond the scope of this synopsis I shall only note that Barrett reads into these later works of Heidegger a concession as regards to his thesis. Also, in the chapter on Heidegger in Irrational Man Barrett makes much of Heidegger’s being mistakenly criticized for “evolving” in his later work when, as Barrett sees it, Heidegger simply extended what was already present in Being and Time.
In the last positive section of the paper Barrett further develops the essential place that the flow of time holds in phenomenological and existential philosophy by tracing the role of time-flow in discussions from Aristotle to Sartre before going on to explaining the impetus for his thought in the concluding chapter. On the second to last page in his only footnote Barrett admits that the entire paper can be taken to be an interpretation of one three word statement in Being and Time: “The world worlds.” Indeed the sentiment Barrett took from this statement should be obvious from the above statements: the world creates possibilities by actualizing some, destroying others and thrusting one into a world renewed yet whose possibilities are by-and-large bound to be destroyed, and still bound to perpetuate itself in an ever forward movement from the remains of what was into the unknown yet-to-be by means of the absolute reality of itself. And all of this, as one cannot fail to note when reviewing the literature, is absolutely limited by death.
Bibliography
Barrett, William. The Flow of Time in The Philosophy of Time, ed. Richard M. Gale, London: Macmillan & Co LTD, 1968: pp. 355-377.
Barrett, William Irrational Man New York: Doubleday, 1958.
Barrett’s first consideration wrestles with historical dating. First, Barrett notes that Heidegger makes much of the fact that we are “thrown” into the world at some time, t, notwithstanding Heidegger’s refusal to acknowledge t as intelligible outside of some “human project” (where project is meant in two senses: a project among one’s many projects, and the project[ion] of one’s existence). Barrett professes the belief that a certain sense of “datability of events” is intelligible outside of particular human projects and projections, e.g. “the fixing of events in relation to before and after”, and that if this fails to be the case then Heidegger brandishes little more than “a mere subjective idealism”. ( 364-5) The process of fixing events in relation to before and after can be thought of as a wanderer marking his trail on some sort of map in order to properly orient himself to his environment, except that for the analogy to fit the wanderer cannot stop nor reverse his journey: his map’s use is exhausted by the process of orientation.
Barrett then remarks on thoughts germinating in later works by Heidegger. As these considerations lie beyond the scope of this synopsis I shall only note that Barrett reads into these later works of Heidegger a concession as regards to his thesis. Also, in the chapter on Heidegger in Irrational Man Barrett makes much of Heidegger’s being mistakenly criticized for “evolving” in his later work when, as Barrett sees it, Heidegger simply extended what was already present in Being and Time.
In the last positive section of the paper Barrett further develops the essential place that the flow of time holds in phenomenological and existential philosophy by tracing the role of time-flow in discussions from Aristotle to Sartre before going on to explaining the impetus for his thought in the concluding chapter. On the second to last page in his only footnote Barrett admits that the entire paper can be taken to be an interpretation of one three word statement in Being and Time: “The world worlds.” Indeed the sentiment Barrett took from this statement should be obvious from the above statements: the world creates possibilities by actualizing some, destroying others and thrusting one into a world renewed yet whose possibilities are by-and-large bound to be destroyed, and still bound to perpetuate itself in an ever forward movement from the remains of what was into the unknown yet-to-be by means of the absolute reality of itself. And all of this, as one cannot fail to note when reviewing the literature, is absolutely limited by death.
Bibliography
Barrett, William. The Flow of Time in The Philosophy of Time, ed. Richard M. Gale, London: Macmillan & Co LTD, 1968: pp. 355-377.
Barrett, William Irrational Man New York: Doubleday, 1958.
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