"A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World, Section I: Being-in" by Hubert Dryfus

The opening section of the third chapter of Hubert Dryfus’ treatise on Being and Time concerns itself with explaining the “being-in” of Dasein. Dryfus tells us “Heidegger calls the activity of existing, ‘being-in-the-world.’” (40) He then sets out distinguishing “being-in-the-world” as an existential concept rather than the more common reading, one might suspect, of the term as referring to a metaphysical concept. As one might suspect, a good chunk of this explanation turns on his discussion of the “being-in” part of “being-in-the-world”.

Dryfus begins by noting the priority with which we treat “in” as it refers an object contained within another object in space. He goes on to juxtapose this common interpretation of the preposition against the “primordial sense of ‘in’ [which] is ‘to reside’, ‘to dwell’.” (42) To dwell and reside are active ways of being, Operating with this understanding we are faced with the problem of being first, and objective in-ness only afterwards. Thus the usual manner of understanding “in” as a relationship between objects is not basic but subsidiary to being-in-the-world.

This distinguishing exercise is supplemented by a discussion on the distinction between what Dryfus calls the metaphorical/literal distinction in language. One reading of Heidegger’s concept of being-in has it that “in” is used metaphorically. This view has it that “being in trouble” is metaphorical since one cannot literally be in trouble: trouble is not one thing in which another can occupy space. This reading misses the take-home message regarding being-in as relating to residing and actively engaging. “Heidegger wants us to see that at an early stage of language the distinction metaphorical/literal has not yet emerged.” (42) Being in trouble is not only metaphorical, it is also contextually definable in the being which finds itself troubled in the world.

From here Dryfus turns towards relating being-in to being-in-the-world. “Being-in as being involved is definitive of Dasein.” (43) As such, Dasein is by defined by its involvement in a world. Further, “Dasein alone can be touched, that is, moved, by objects and other Daseins,” and it is due to the involvement of Dasein with objects and other Daseins that Dasein comes to acquire know-how. “Not only is Dasein's activity conditioned by cultural interpretations of facts about its body, such as being male or female, but since Dasein must define itself in terms of social roles that require certain activities, and since its roles require equipment, Dasein is at the mercy of factual events and objects in its environment. (44)” This last point is what pushes us from being-in to being-in-the world, what we have translated as being-alongside and what Dreyfus calls being-amidst: “What Heidegger is getting at is a mode of being-in we might call "inhabiting." When we inhabit something, it is no longer an object for us but becomes part of us and pervades our relation to other objects in the world.“ (45) This pervasive feature of my objects as they relate to my being and other beings has been obscured by the tradition, even though it “is Dasein's basic way of being-in-the-world.” (45)


"A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World, Section I: Being-in" by Hubert Dryfus in Being-in-the-world : A Commentary On Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.

Heidegger's Being and Time by Dermot Moran

Dermot Moran’s “Heidegger’s Being and Time” attempts to evaluate the place of Being and Time in the phenomenological tradition subsequent Husserl. Moran understands the tradition of phenomenology, to the extent that phenomenology can be called a tradition, as the divergent amalgamation of thinkers operating in their own self-identified practice of phenomenology. The common strand found in each of these thinkers is an emphasis on dealing with phenomena as such, and for Heidegger particularly this is understood as acknowledging the appearance of objects insofar as they appear in Dasein (literally "being there").

The central aim of Moran’s paper is to lay out the phenomenological aspects of Heidegger’s inquiry in Being and Time. To do this, Moran begins by relating the genesis and evolution of Heidegger’s phenomenology, prior to the publication of Being and Time, as germinating in his review of Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of World Views, in his interpretation of Aristotle, and in what Moran calls Heidegger’s “critical appropriation” of Husserl’s phenomenology as a practice along with Husserl’s conception of intentionality. Heidegger criticizes the abstract quality of Jasper’s philosophy of life in favor of a phenomenology historically bounded by a living being, he infuses Aristotle’s concepts with phenomenological content, and he created a distinct method from the basic notion in Husserl’s phenomenology (“to the thing in itself”) while throwing out key notions to Husserl’s phenomenological enterprise (e.g. intentionality and the transcendental ego, among many others). All of this provides the groundwork, says Moran, for Heidegger’s enterprise of asking the question of the meaning of Being.

Moran continues to develop Heidegger by discussing the distinction between ready-at-hand and present-at-hand, the “fusion of phenomenology with hermeneutics” (234), the hermeneutical circle, the nature of Dasein, authenticity, angst, mood, and being-with. A being’s being ready-at-hand or present-at-hand has everything to do with how the thing (construed phenomenologically) discloses itself to Dasein: as a tool or as an object of inquiry. Moreover, an object’s being ready-at-hand is how it is initially disclosed to Dasein. By the fusion of phenomenology with hermeneutics Moran has in mind Heidegger’s understanding phenomena as the primordial datum associated with being-in-the-world that are given meaning through interpretation. This interpretation is always done in a context of prejudices (taken non-pejoratively) or what Searle calls a background of information (though Heidegger's conception is at least as rich as Quine's "web of belief"), and the interpretation itself creates and destroys prejudices (or background information, or nodes in the web of belief). This view of the world leads to what is called the hermeneutical circle, construed by the naïve observer as the “circle” Heidegger is stuck in between prejudices and interpretation. The objection is that Heidegger cannot account for new knowledge. The objection is easily avoided by considering Heidegger’s notion of being “thrust” into the world, that being-in-the-world is primary, and that we are and can only be able to gain knowledge by allowing phenomena to disclose their being. This latter possibility requires diligence on the part of the enquirer for its realizability. Moran goes on from there to give phenomenological descriptions of Being-as-authentic, being-towards-death, mood for being, and being-with-others.

A Synopsis of William Barrett’s The Flow of Time

In The Flow of Time William Barrett argues that the flowing of time into the future is as primordial a datum as Heidegger’s view of time as a field of “past-present-future” (where time is understood to be a unifying, possibility-producing synthesis relied on heavily in Being and Time). Barrett propounds Heidegger’s construal of time, as a structuring ontological field rather than a mere “sequence of disjunct Now’s”, as “one of the most original of contemporary views on this ancient subject.” (356) As such, Barrett’s point of contention regarding Heidegger is restricted to the foundational, pre-philosophic landscape (to which, presumably, we each were party in, at least, our early childhood) that yields the notion of time in its disparate historical forms. (364) Accordingly, a correct account of time and the one that Heidegger implicitly relies on, according to Barrett, incorporates the flow of time within the horizon of possibility afforded by temporality.

Barrett’s first consideration wrestles with historical dating. First, Barrett notes that Heidegger makes much of the fact that we are “thrown” into the world at some time, t, notwithstanding Heidegger’s refusal to acknowledge t as intelligible outside of some “human project” (where project is meant in two senses: a project among one’s many projects, and the project[ion] of one’s existence). Barrett professes the belief that a certain sense of “datability of events” is intelligible outside of particular human projects and projections, e.g. “the fixing of events in relation to before and after”, and that if this fails to be the case then Heidegger brandishes little more than “a mere subjective idealism”. ( 364-5) The process of fixing events in relation to before and after can be thought of as a wanderer marking his trail on some sort of map in order to properly orient himself to his environment, except that for the analogy to fit the wanderer cannot stop nor reverse his journey: his map’s use is exhausted by the process of orientation.

Barrett then remarks on thoughts germinating in later works by Heidegger. As these considerations lie beyond the scope of this synopsis I shall only note that Barrett reads into these later works of Heidegger a concession as regards to his thesis. Also, in the chapter on Heidegger in Irrational Man Barrett makes much of Heidegger’s being mistakenly criticized for “evolving” in his later work when, as Barrett sees it, Heidegger simply extended what was already present in Being and Time.

In the last positive section of the paper Barrett further develops the essential place that the flow of time holds in phenomenological and existential philosophy by tracing the role of time-flow in discussions from Aristotle to Sartre before going on to explaining the impetus for his thought in the concluding chapter. On the second to last page in his only footnote Barrett admits that the entire paper can be taken to be an interpretation of one three word statement in Being and Time: “The world worlds.” Indeed the sentiment Barrett took from this statement should be obvious from the above statements: the world creates possibilities by actualizing some, destroying others and thrusting one into a world renewed yet whose possibilities are by-and-large bound to be destroyed, and still bound to perpetuate itself in an ever forward movement from the remains of what was into the unknown yet-to-be by means of the absolute reality of itself. And all of this, as one cannot fail to note when reviewing the literature, is absolutely limited by death.

Bibliography
Barrett, William. The Flow of Time in The Philosophy of Time, ed. Richard M. Gale, London: Macmillan & Co LTD, 1968: pp. 355-377.
Barrett, William Irrational Man New York: Doubleday, 1958.